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Introduction
Foreign aid granted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in OECD donor countries is subject to considerable controversy. It is increasingly disputed whether the allocation of NGO aid is superior to the allocation of official development assistance (ODA). Recent findings indicate that NGOs tend to imitate the allocation of ODA rather than trying to excel and using their comparative advantages in reaching the poor and working in difficult local environments. Critics suspect that financial dependence on official "backdonors," i.e., government agencies co-financing the NGOs, undermines the autonomy of NGOs in allocating aid. In particular, financial dependence may weaken the incentive of NGOs to address entrenched forms of poverty and go where official donors are hardly present. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to assess the link between financial dependence and the allocation of NGO aid systematically, based on a large panel of Swiss NGOs and aid recipient countries.
In contrast to the extensive literature on the allocation of ODA, empirical studies analyzing the allocation of NGO aid are still rare -despite its considerable importance in quantitative terms. and the donors' (political and economic) self interest, casts into doubt the still widely held belief that the targeting of NGO aid is generally more needs-based than that of ODA. Nancy and Yontcheva (2006) as well as Koch et al. (2009) take a different approach by adding ODA to the list of explanatory variables of NGO aid. In this way, it is tested whether NGOs imitate the allocation of ODA. This turns out to be the case for the sample of 61 NGOs from various donor countries in Koch et al. (2009) . By contrast, the allocation of aid by European NGOs appears to be unaffected by ODA from the EU, even though the sample covered by Nancy and Yontcheva (2006) comprises officially co-financed NGOs.
While we essentially follow the approach of the latter two papers, this study draws on an exceptionally detailed database on Swiss NGO aid, allowing us to evaluate previously untested hypotheses. First of all, we use NGO-specific data on aid allocation across low and middle-income countries by more than 300 organizations. Second, we distinguish between self-financed and officially co-financed NGO aid; for NGOs relying on official co-financing we are thus able to assess whether the allocation of co-financed funds differs from the allocation of own resources. Third, and most importantly, we classify all NGOs according to their financing structure. This renders it possible to assess the much disputed issue of whether the degree of financial dependence on official backdonors affects the allocation of NGO aid.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we refer to the principal-agent model of Fruttero and Gauri (2005) from which we derive several hypotheses concerning the effects of financial dependence on the allocation behavior of NGOs. The database on Swiss NGO aid is described in Section 3 which also presents the panel Tobit approach. Empirical results are shown in Section 4. We find that Swiss NGOs follow the state as well as NGO peers when allocating their aid. Furthermore, officially refinanced NGOs are more inclined to imitate the allocation of ODA. However, the degree of financial dependence does not affect the poverty orientation of NGO aid and the incentives of NGOs to engage in easier environments. The effects of financial dependence on herding among NGOs differ between the allocation of self-financed aid and the allocation of officially co-financed aid.
Analytical Background and Hypotheses
Traditional "articles of faith" (Tendler 1982) credit NGOs for being closer to the poor by circumventing governments in the recipient countries and dealing directly with local target groups (Riddell et al. 1995) . Moreover, the World Bank (1998) posited that government-to-government transfers do not work when governance is particularly deficient in the recipient country, and argued that
NGOs have a comparative advantage of working in difficult environments.
Some critics suspected in the 1990s already that NGOs might be less autonomous than widely believed. According to Edwards and Hulme (1996: 970) , the relations of NGOs with state agencies are "too close for comfort" -with NGOs often becoming "the implementer of the policy agendas" of governments. Likewise, Fisher (1997) argues that "while the moniker 'nongovernment organization' suggests autonomy from government organizations, NGOs are often intimately connected with their home governments." In particular, the view has come under attack that NGOs have a stronger focus on the poor than state agencies. The critics' attempts to demystify NGO aid have largely in common with the proponents'
articles of faith that they have rarely been subjected to empirical scrutiny. This applies especially to the conjecture that financial dependence of NGOs on government funding works against better targeted NGO aid. The principal-agent model of Fruttero and Gauri (2005) offers important insights on how official backdonors may weaken the incentives of NGOs to excel and compromise their charitable motivations. Several testable hypotheses can be derived from this model.
2 See the references given in Edwards and Hulme (1996) ; more recent examples include Amin et al. (2003) . Bebbington (2005: 937) notes that earlier "celebrations meant that inevitably disillusion would follow, and indeed it did." Fruttero and Gauri (2005) show that the dependence of NGOs (the agents) on external funding (from official backdonors as principals) tends to drive a wedge between charitable objectives such as poverty alleviation in the recipient countries and organizational imperatives related to future NGO operations and sustained funding. This happens even if principals and agents share altruistic aid motivations. Principals have incomplete information on NGO projects, while future funding of agents depends on perceived success or failure of current projects. NGOs having to demonstrate success are inclined to avoid locations where "the risk of a failure is so high that it could jeopardize the flow of funding from donors" (Fruttero and Gauri 2005: 761) .
Risk aversion could shape NGOs' aid allocation in several respects. First, it weakens their incentive to operate in difficult environments where the probability of failure is particularly high.
NGOs facing fiercer competition for funding may rather allocate aid strategically to where success is easier to achieve (see also Bebbington 2004 As for aid allocation across recipient countries, however, the scarcity of data on the re-financing of NGOs has so far prevented systematic testing of the hypothesis that financial dependence on official backdonors distorts the allocation of NGO aid. As noted in the Introduction, Nancy and Yontcheva (2006) and Koch et al. (2009) come to opposing results on whether NGOs take the allocation of aid by official agencies into account when deciding on where to engage. Neither of the two studies differentiates between more and less financially dependent NGOs, however. 3 Both studies have also in common that self-financed NGO aid is not treated separately from officially co-financed aid, even though the allocation of these aid categories may differ from each other. These major shortcomings can be overcome by drawing on the exceptionally detailed database on Swiss NGO aid, described in the next section. These data will then be used to address the proposition of Fruttero and Gauri (2005: 773) that "an NGO might have to undertake pragmatic actions (that is, actions that increase the probability of survival, but that would not be undertaken were the NGO independent of external funding)."
Specifically, it will be tested for a large panel of NGOs and recipient countries whether financial dependence leads NGOs to mimic the aid allocation of their official backdonors and NGO peers, weakens the poverty orientation of NGO aid, and provides disincentives for NGOs to work in difficult environments.
Data and Method
Swiss NGO Aid
The contributions. Share is below ten percent for seven of the 40 NGOs, whereas it exceeds 70 percent for another seven NGOs. Within the sub-sample, Share is negatively correlated with NGO size in terms of (self-financed plus officially co-financed) NGO aid, but the correlation coefficient of -0.26 is statistically significant at the ten percent level only. At the same time, the correlation of 0.63 between self-financed NGO aid and contributions is statistically significant at the one percent level. Note that NGOaid is the sum of self-financed and officially co-financed NGO aid (in 1000 US$). Share is the relation of contributions to NGOaid.
Officially cofinanced NGOs 40 49.9
Explanatory Variables
In line with the previous literature on aid allocation, we include a standard set of possible determinants of NGO aid. First of all, the logged per-capita GDP (purchasing power parity adjusted constant 2000 international US$) of recipient countries provides an indicator of need which has repeatedly been shown to shape the distribution of aid (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Berthélemy 2006; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006) . We expect the marginal effects of per-capita GDP on aid to be significantly negative. Second, we use "control of corruption" (Corruption for short) as presented by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) to measure institutional development, with higher index values indicating less corruption. The effect on NGO aid is ambiguous a priori. The argument that NGOs have a comparative advantage to work in difficult environments implies a negative correlation between NGO aid and Corruption. As noted in Section 2, however, NGOs may rather prefer environments where success is easier to achieve. Third, we control for (logged) population of recipient countries, which is required as the dependent variable is not in per-capita terms. Fourth, we account for natural disasters which often motivate emergency aid to recipient countries; the severity of disasters is proxied by the logged number of people affected (Disaster).
8 Fifth, we set a dummy variable equal to one for so-called fragile states (Fragile); fragile states may confront donors with a particularly difficult environment, though one in which aid may provide an effective means of post-conflict resolution (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) .
In addition to these variables, we follow Nancy and Yontcheva (2006) Moreover, as noted above, we interact ODAresid with Share. This implies that Share by itself has to be included in the list of explanatory variables. If financially more dependent NGOs are more likely to mimic the allocation of ODA, the coefficient on the interaction term should be positive and significant. We also control for a particular NGO's budget (NGO budget), as larger NGOs tend to grant higher amounts of aid to a particular recipient country, all else equal. Finally, we also take account of 8 Gassebner et al. (2009) show that while natural disasters destroy a country's export capacities, their impact on imports depend on the level of democracy. While autocracies have lower levels of imports in the aftermath of disasters, democracies increase their imports, e.g., via increased aid flows. 9 More precisely, we consider Swiss public aid minus contributions as the latter are included in the former. 10 Recent studies include Berthelémy (2006), Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) , Dollar and Levin (2006) , Kuziemko and Werker (2007) and Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) . In summary, we specify NGOaid ij (aid from NGO i to recipient country j) as a function of the following variables:
We extend this basic specification in several ways. For instance, we account for the possibility that financial dependence might also affect the impact of country characteristics (per-capita GDP, Corruption and Fragile) on the allocation of NGO aid. Hence, we also interact Share with these characteristics. Furthermore, we assess the incentive of NGOs to allocate aid to where other NGOs are active as well. In other words, the hypothesized conformity of location choices is tested with respect to both official backdonors and NGO peers.
Appendix 1 provides detailed definitions and sources for all variables. Appendices 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics and the bivariate correlation matrix, respectively.
Method
A distinguishing feature of our data is that the dependent variable has many zero observations. The clustering of zero observations is due to the fact that most NGOs, especially small NGOs, engage in a limited number of recipient countries; e.g., they may focus on a particular region. This requires a nonlinear method of estimation as OLS estimations would be biased. 13 We adopt a random effects panel Tobit approach with Swiss NGOs and aid recipient countries representing the two dimensions of our data:
where y ij stands for aid from NGO i to recipient country j and x ij refers to the determinants of NGO aid; v i are the random effects, while u ij is an iid error term.
Note that the coefficient β cannot be interpreted directly in the context of the nonlinear Tobit model. Instead, we are interested in the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on either P(y ij >0 | x ij ), E(y ij | x ij ,y ij >0) or E(y ij | x ij ). We calculate them below at the mean of the respective covariates. Given that our model also includes interaction terms, we face an additional complication:
Interpreting the interaction effect in nonlinear models (such as Tobit) is not analogous to linear models.
As Ai and Norton (2003: 123) point out, "the magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term." It can even be "of opposite sign." Moreover, a simple t-test on the coefficient of the interaction term is not appropriate to test for the significance of the interaction. Rather, we have to calculate the cross derivative in order to test for the significance of the respective coefficient (e.g., at the mean of all independent variables). Omitting subscripts, for the overall marginal effect E(y ij | x ij ) we obtain:
with φ indicating the standard normal density function, Φ the cumulative standard normal stribution, di σ being the standard deviation, and 
),
with λ being the ratio between φ and Φ . Note that in contrast to linear models, the significance of the interac iddle income countries, and excludes countries with per-capita GDP exceeding US$ 13.000.
tion term depends on all variables included in the model. 14 Finally, the dependent variables are skewed so that we logged them, following standard practice in large parts of the aid allocation literature. The sample of recipients comprises 126 low-and m 14 We calculate the marginal effects using the nlcom command of Stata, version 10.1. 
Empirical Results
Overall NGO Sample
The interpretation of our results is largely restricted to the overall marginal effects (OMEs) that the explanatory variables have on E(y ij | x ij ). The marginal effects of the interaction terms and the interacted variables (and their corresponding standard errors) are calculated following (2) and (5) above. While we do not show tables reporting the marginal effects according to (3) and (4), we discuss them in the text for our variables of main interest. Tables 2 and 3 report the results for the overall sample of 307 Swiss NGOs. While Table 2 shows the coefficients of the respective variables, Table 3 reports the corresponding OMEs.
The basic specification in column (1) is restricted to the standard determinants of aid, in order to be able to compare our results with earlier work. Recall that the present results are based on a panel analysis of NGO-specific aid, whereas previous studies typically consider aggregate NGO aid.
Nevertheless, the findings on the standard aid determinants are very similar. Our measure of need for aid, per-capita GDP, turns out to be negative and significant at the one percent level (i.e., as expected, higher-income countries get less aid). Also at the one percent level of significance, the positive coefficient on population signals that larger countries receive more NGO aid. Corruption and Fragile are not significant at conventional levels as in Nunnenkamp et al. (2009) , indicating that Swiss NGOs do not grant more aid to countries with difficult environments -even though the World Bank (1998) suggests that NGOs may have a comparative advantage to work there. Finally, NGOs grant more aid to recipient countries hit by (more serious) disasters, at the one percent level of significance.
In column (2) we add ODA to the basic specification. As can be seen, NGO aid rises with ODA, at the one percent level of significance. However, the results also show that per-capita GDP becomes insignificant when ODA is included, nicely illustrating why we prefer to purge ODA of its likely determinants and to use ODAresid rather than ODA.
Before turning to the impact of ODAresid, we test for the potential endogeneity of ODAresid with respect to NGO aid. Arguably, even though we purged the original ODA variable from the influence of those variables we control for in the regression, omitted variables might drive both ODA and NGO aid. To formally test for endogeneity, we make use of an instrument that has become standard in the recent political economy literature on aid: a country's voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. The empirical literature on political influences shows that developing countries get more aid and better terms from official donors when they have closer political ties with the donor, as measured by their voting behavior in the General Assembly (Thacker 1999 Turning to the results with ODAresid included, the standard determinants of NGO aid are hardly affected as compared to column (1) when augmenting the specification by our variables of principal interest in columns (3) and (4). In particular, per-capita GDP is significant at the one percent level again. We now also include the NGO's overall budget, which enters with the expected positive coefficient, significant at the one percent level. Swiss ODA and its interaction with the NGO's financial dependence on official backdonors clearly affect the allocation of NGO aid. According to the marginal effects shown in Table 3 , ODAresid is significant at the one percent level at the mean of the independent variables when included individually (column 3) and has the expected positive coefficient.
This result holds when calculating the marginal effects according to equations (3) and (4) Next, we account for additional interactions of Share with other explanatory variables. Note that we keep the interaction with ODAresid in columns (6)- (10) 5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  5040  Number of NGOs  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Total NGO aid NGO aid proper Contributions
According to the results, and in line with the principal-agent model of Fruttero and Gauri (2005) , the significantly positive coefficient on #NGOs_resid indicates that NGOs grant more aid to where their peers are engaged as well, controlled for the usual determinants of location choice. Arguably, conformity of location choices tends to render it more difficult for principals to assess and sanction individual agents, increasing the incentive to go where others already are. But the results in column (10) of Table 3 reveal that the incentive to hide in the NGO crowd does not depend on financial dependence on the official backdonor. In quantitative terms, an increase in the number of #NGOs_resid present in a particular country by one increases NGO aid by 0.003 percent. This result holds when using the number of NGOs, rather than the residual, at the one percent level of significance. Note also that all major results on other determinants of NGO aid remain.
Officially Co-financed NGOs
We now turn to the sub-sample of 40 Swiss NGOs that actually received official co-financing, though to widely different degree (see Section 3). The specification of the Tobit models is as before except that we do not report all of the previous extensions. We replicate the estimations for total aid granted by the sub-sample of officially co-financed NGOs in columns (1)- (5) of Table 4 . 20 More interestingly, however, we perform separate estimations by distinguishing between the two types of NGO aid, i.e., self-financed NGO aid proper in columns (6)-(10) and officially co-financed contributions in columns (11)-(15).
In several respects, the results for total NGO aid in Table 4 are fairly similar to those reported before for the overall sample of 307 Swiss NGOs. Once again, population, the NGO's budget, and the severity of disasters enter positively and highly significantly. Poorer countries still get more aid, even though the level of significance is lower than in Table 3 . The insignificance of the two indicators Corruption and Fragile reveals that the institutional environment prevailing in the recipient countries did not shape the allocation of aid by the sub-sample of NGOs, in line with the findings for the overall sample. There is also a close resemblance of findings in that NGOs generally tend to follow the allocation of ODA and go where other NGOs are present. In contrast to the full sample, it appears that the incentive to mimic the state no longer strengthens with stronger financial dependence on public cofinancing. The interaction of Share with ODAresid turns insignificant in column (3). However, when calculating the effect of the interaction for each individual observation rather than at the mean, the effect is still significant, at the ten percent level at least, for almost 40 percent of the observations. The interaction with #NGOs_resid turns out to be negative and significant at the ten percent level in column (5) of Table 4 .
The effect of the interaction between Share and ODAresid may weaken in the reduced sample as the "dependency syndrome" (DCC, 2004: 59) results at least partly from accepting public cofinancing at all, and not only from co-financing contributing a large share to the NGO's overall budget.
At the same time, the interaction effects may work in opposite directions for the two types of aid in the sub-sample of NGOs. This possibility is addressed next by raising the question of whether officially cofinanced NGOs allocate self-financed aid differently from the contributions of the backdonor.
Indeed, the allocation of NGO aid proper differs in several respects from the allocation of contributions. 21 The evidence is mixed on whether NGOs are more inclined to allocate contributions to countries offering an easier environment. In conflict with this proposition, the poverty orientation of contributions does not appear to be consistently weaker than that of NGO aid proper. On the other hand, Corruption enters significantly positively in columns (12)- (15) NGOs attempting to secure future financing by demonstrating success stories. The same bias could result from official backdonors using the co-financing of NGOs as a means to channel aid to well governed recipient countries. In this way, aid agencies such as DCC may have circumvented mission statements that require them to engage primarily in less benign environments in order to actively fight problems of corruption.
Regarding the allocation of contributions, we find strong evidence on NGOs mimicking the state. Calculating the elasticity of contributions with respect to ODAresid reveals an elasticity of 0.18 percent at the mean of the variables (Column 12). In addition, the incentive of NGOs to mimic the state and follow NGO peers strengthens with stronger dependence on official refinancing. According to columns (13) and (15) of Table 4 , the interaction of Share with both ODAresid and, respectively, #NGOs_resid turns out to be significantly positive at the five percent level, calculated at the mean of the other variables, with a marginal effect of 0.242 for ODAresid*Share in column (13). Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of the interaction term corresponding to the model shown in column (13) (with 90 percent confidence intervals) depending on the expected value of the contributions. For almost 21 By contrast, the results for NGO aid proper are very close to those for total NGO aid. This is not surprising recalling that NGO aid proper accounts for the bulk of total NGO aid even in the sub-sample of officially co-financed NGOs. Note also that total NGO aid and NGO aid proper are highly correlated, while the correlation with contributions is relatively weak (Appendix 3). 22 This does not hold for Fragile, however.
80 percent of the observations, the marginal effect is significant at the ten percent level at least. The figure also shows that the quantitative impact does not systematically depend on the (expected) values of contributions. Herding behaviour can also be observed when it comes to the allocation of NGO aid proper.
The overall marginal effects of ODAresid as well as #NGOs_resid are significantly positive at the one percent level. In contrast to contributions, however, the degree to which NGOs depend on official backdonors has no say on their incentive to mimic the allocation behaviour of the backdonor, according to column (8) of Table 4 . The interaction of Share with #NGOs_resid turns out to be negative, at the five percent level of significance, for NGO aid proper (column 10).
In particular the latter finding suggests that the allocation of NGO aid tends to be affected not only by financial dependence on official backdonors but also by the competition for private donations.
Note that NGOs with less official refinancing are under fiercer pressure to raise a sufficient amount of private donations. Arguably, private donations respond to visible success stories -i.e., obviously successful NGO projects -in essentially the same way as does official refinancing, especially when the allocation of NGO aid proper is concerned. In other words, principal-agent problems are not confined to official backdonors. This would explain that the interaction effects of Share work in opposite directions for the two types of NGO aid. Yet both types of aid would still have in common that herding of NGOs tends to reduce the risk of future financing.
Summary and Conclusions
While NGO aid has gained considerable importance in quantitative terms, it is increasingly disputed whether the allocation of NGO aid is superior to that of ODA. Principal-agent models suggest that
NGOs have incentives to follow official donors and NGO peers, rather than trying to excel and swim against the tide. However, empirical studies systematically evaluating the allocation of NGO aid are still rare -in contrast to the extensive literature on the allocation of ODA.
To help closing this gap we draw on the exceptionally rich, though largely ignored, data on aid granted by Swiss NGOs. We contribute in three important ways to the nascent literature on NGO aid.
First, we perform panel Tobit estimations covering more than 300 NGOs and essentially all aid recipient countries. Second, we distinguish between self-financed NGO aid and officially co-financed NGO aid. Third, and most importantly, we classify all NGOs according to their financial dependence on government support. This allows us to address the unresolved issue of whether financial dependence on official backdonors induces NGOs to mimic the allocation of ODA and go where most NGO are active, rather than deciding autonomously on where to engage.
We find that NGOs are generally inclined to follow official donors. At the same time, the inclination to mimic the allocation of ODA turns out to be stronger for NGOs receiving official cofinancing. The finding that financial dependence strengthens parallel behavior of NGOs and the state is robust to changes in the specification of the estimation equation for the full sample. We also support the view that NGOs tend to locate where their peers are active, probably because conformity of location choices renders it more difficult for official backdonors to assess and sanction individual NGOs.
In contrast to what one might suspect, financial dependence did not impair the poverty orientation of NGO aid. Neither did we find evidence that financially dependent NGOs have weaker incentives to engage in difficult environments. This seems to be largely because Swiss NGOs were generally reluctant to go where ODA is widely supposed to fail due to particularly weak institutions and deficient governance. There are some indications, however, that the allocation of one particular type of NGO aid, namely officially co-financed aid, is biased towards recipient countries with less corruption. Finally, it is this type of NGO aid for which a higher degree of financial dependence considerably strengthens the inclination of NGOs to follow official backdonors. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
